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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

LYNETTE MANSKE TORRES,

: APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

JOHN MARTIN TORRES,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

z Case No. 920101-CA
: Civil
No.
884902184

DA

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-2(i) (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

The

Court

abused

its

discretion

by

awarding

Defendant a lien against Plaintiff's residence where there is no
equity in the residence and Defendant made no contribution to the
mortgage payment while living there.

Thompson v. Thompson, 709

P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,
1222 (Utah 1980); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).
2.

The Court abused its discretion in requiring the

Plaintiff to make payments on gifts of two rings, which were given
to her by the Defendant, and which were taken by the Defendant at
2

the time of the parties' separation in January, 1989, and are
currently retained in his possession. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988).
3.

The Court abused its discretion by requiring the

Plaintiff to participate in the payment of medical expenses for the
surgery performed for a deviated septum and ventral hernia, when
there would have been no charges beyond the deductible, had the
Defendant not unilaterally canceled Plaintiff's health insurance
the same day as the operation without giving anyone notice other
than the health carrier. Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981).
4.

The Court abused its discretion by failing to award

the Plaintiff at least one-half of her attorney's fees which would
not have been incurred but for the Defendant's acts in violation of
reasonable rules of equity by taking the rings, which he had given
to the Plaintiff as gifts and by cancelling the health insurance
for the Plaintiff on the date of her surgery, August 15, 1990.
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section 30-3-5(1) in pertinent part states:

When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the Court
may include in it equitable
orders relating
to
the children,
property and
parties.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from a Supplemental Decree of
Divorce entered in the Third Judicial District Court, In and For
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on January 21, 1992. A Decree of
Divorce was entered in this matter by the Court on February 4, 1991
and all other matters were reserved for trial.
RELEVANT FACTS
1.

A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on

January 30, 1991, through a bifurcated proceeding reserving all
remaining issues to be tried by the Court.
2.
January

The Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered on

21, 1992

(attached

as Exhibit

"A") and provided

in

pertinent part as follows:
(1) At paragraph two, the Defendant was awarded an
equity lien against the Plaintiff's residence
in the amount of $4,000;
(2) At paragraph four, the Decree directed that
the Plaintiff

shall be

purchased

the

by

awarded

Defendant

two rings

from

Morgan

Jewelers and given to the Plaintiff as gifts
on or about September 26, 1987.
Plaintiff

was

ordered

to

However,

reimburse

the

Defendant for any payments he made to Morgan
4

Jewelers

for

separation

the

in

rings

since

mid-January,

the parties'
1989.

The

Defendant was allowed to hold a possessory
lien on the rings until the payments required
by Plaintiff are fully satisfied and, further,
directed the Defendant to restore the original
stones to the rings and obtain certification
from Morgan Jewelers that the rings are the
same as they were when originally delivered to
him in September, 1987.
(3)

At paragraph six, the Court ordered that each
of the parties would pay one-half of the total
medical

bills

incurred

for

surgery

and

treatment to the Plaintiff on or about August
15, 1990 for a deviated
hernia,

even

though

septum and ventral
the

terminated

the

medical

Plaintiff

which

would

Defendant

insurance
have

paid

for
for

had
the
said

surgery, and the termination of the insurance
occurred on the date of surgery, August 15,
1990.
(4)

At paragraph

seven, the Court ordered

each

parties

of

the
5

would

pay

their

that
own

labor was hired, and the Plaintiff and her two
daughters
reasonable

were

involved

value

for

in

the work.

all

of

the

A
home

improvements, at the time of completion, was
$12,000. Even though the home had depreciated
over the past several years, the improvements
have added value to the property.

It is

reasonable for the Defendant to be awarded
$4,000

as

the

reasonable

value

of

his

contributions to the improvements.
(5)

The Court found that the Defendant purchased
two ladies' rings from Morgan Jewelers, one
costing $1,575 and the other costing $2,538.
The total charges incurred by the Defendant on
his account at Morgan Jewelers was $4,327.03.
Shortly before Christmas 1987, Defendant gave
the rings to the Plaintiff as gifts. When the
parties separated, the Defendant was still
paying on the rings.
rings

to

the

The Court awarded the

Plaintiff

but

allowed

the

Defendant to continue to hold a possessory
lien on the rings until she paid the Defendant
for all payments made since January, 1989,
8

when the parties separated. The Court further
found

that the Defendant

had

removed

the

original stones from the rings and found that
the original stones should be restored to the
rings and certified by Morgan Jewelers that
they were

in the

same condition

as when

originally purchased.
(6)

Defendant

caused

Plaintiff's

insurance

coverage to be terminated effective August,
1990, several months before the divorce was
granted

in

controlling
coverage.

this

matter.

Orders

There

concerning

were

health

no

care

The Court found at pre-trial on

February 1, 1990, that the Plaintiff testified
that the Defendant had mentioned to her that
he had taken her off the insurance coverage,
and that the Court had admonished Defendant to
reinstate the coverage.
record

other

than

the

The Court found no
testimony

of

the

Plaintiff, and found that no Order had been
entered

by

the

insurance.

9

Court

on

the

issue

of

attorney's

fees and costs they

incurred in

these proceedings.
3.

In support of the foregoing Order, the Court entered

Findings of Facts (attached as Exhibit "B") as follows:
(1)

Plaintiff was living in her own home with her
daughters

from

relationship

a previous

commenced

marriage

with

the

when

a

Defendant.

She was a self-employed cosmetologist.
(2)

The parties did not file a joint tax return
for the year 1986, the year of the marriage.
Plaintiff

sustained

an

operating

loss

of

approximately $3,800 in her business for that
year.

Defendant started employment for C. R.

England and Sons sometime around that time,
but

apparently

did

not

have

sufficient

earnings to justify the filing of a joint tax
return and the use of the net operating loss
for tax purposes.
(3)

In

1987, Defendant

brought

in

earnings

of

$26,500, while Plaintiff reported $787 income
from

her

business.

approximately

$24,000

Defendant
in

1988

earned

while

the

Plaintiff earned approximately $4,200 from her
6

business.

Joint returns were not filed in

1989 and Plaintiff had a net income from her
business

for

that

year

of

approximately

$8,800.
(4) Plaintiff purchased her home...in 1982 for
approximately $52,000.

The Defendant claims

an interest in that home. As of May 13, 1991,
the

value

of

the

home

was

appraised

at

$37,000, even though the home has a current
mortgage of approximately $47,000. During the
marriage,

the

home

carpeted,

the

fireplace

refinished,

the

was

re-painted,
was

basement

removed

was

reand

finished,

including finishing of a bathroom, cedar was
installed

in

the

closet,

a

banister

was

installed down the stairway, the backyard was
completed, and a cement patio was installed.
Also, ceramic tile was installed in the entry
way and kitchen.

There were materials and

outside labor costs of approximately $6,000,
most of which came from joint marital funds.
The greater part of the labor was performed by
the Defendant, and a small portion of the
7

)

The Court further found that on August 15,
1990, surgical correction of a deviated septum
and

a ventral

Plaintiff,

hernia

took

place

and the Utah Public

for the

Employee's

Health Program declined payment for lack of
coverage, because the Defendant had terminated
health

care

coverage

on

the

date

of the

surgery, August 15, 1990. The termination of
the coverage was retroactive to August 1,
1990. The total medical bills for the surgery
were in the amount of $4,690, and Plaintiff
asked

recovery

of

this

amount

deductible) against the Defendant.

(less

The Court

found that since there was no Order regarding
health insurance coverage, it is reasonable
that the obligations be treated as any other
marital obligation and each pay one-half of
the liability.
)

Each party was seeking attorney's fees, but
the Court found that neither demonstrated a
need for an award of fees.

Further, each of

the parties, in concert with their attorneys,
contributed

to
10

the

inability

to

settle.

Plaintiff,

because

of

the

nature

of

the

disputed assets, wanted everything and the
Defendant felt justified in wanting something.
When the dropping of the health and medical
coverage on Plaintiff occurred, that ended any
possibility of settlement.
high

price

in

these

Each party paid a

proceedings,

and

on

balance, each party should bear their own
attorney's fees and costs.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court is required to enter equitable

orders relating to the marital estate.

The marital residence was

pre-marital property which the Plaintiff purchased with her own
funds and which had a negative value at the time of the Decree of
Divorce; it was an abuse of discretion to award the Defendant an
equitable lien in the marital residence.
2.

The Court failed to follow settled legal principals

regarding gifts to spouses as being separate property when it
awarded the Plaintiff two rings which were gifted to her by the
Defendant

in September, 1987, but required the Plaintiff to

reimburse Defendant for all payments made on the rings after the
parties separated in January, 1989.

11

3.

The Court abused its discretion in requiring the

Plaintiff to pay one-half of the medical expenses incurred for her
operation

on August

15,

1990 where

the

Defendant,

who

had

historically maintained and paid the medical insurance for the
parties, but canceled the insurance policy on the same day as the
operation without prior notice to the Plaintiff.
4.

The Court abused its discretion in failing to award

the Plaintiff at least one-half of her attorney's fees where the
Defendant's outrageous actions precipitated the necessity of trial
on the issues.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

The

Court

Abused

Its

Discretion

in

Awarding

Defendant an Equitable Lien in the Plaintiff's Residence Where the
Residence Had a Negative Value and was a Pre-marital Asset.
Court

awarded

the

Defendant

a

$4,000.00

equitable

Plaintiff's home (Supplemental Decree, para. 2).

lien

The
in

The Plaintiff

purchased the home in 1982 for $52,000.00; as of May 13, 1991, it
had an appraisal value of $37,000.00. As of the date of trial, the
then current mortgage was $47,000.00 (Findings of Fact, para. 7).
The Defendant paid no rent or mortgage payments, but the trial
court based its award on work which had been performed by the
Defendant to improve the value of the home. All materials used in
the maintenance were paid from joint marital funds.
12

There is no

dispute that as of the date of trial, the residence had a negative
value.
The Court awarded the Defendant an equitable interest in
property which had no equity, and in effect, further increased the
debt on Plaintiff's home by $4,000.00.

Where interpreting the

equitable division statutes governing Divorce Decrees (§ 30-3-5(1),
Utah Code Annotated), Utah courts consistently recognize that trial
courts are conferred with broad discretion in dividing property
between the parties to a divorce purely based upon equitable
circumstances. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-135 (Utah 1987).
However, trial courts are required to make the ultimate division
equitable.

Equitable distribution of personal and real property

requires that the property be fairly divided between the parties,
given

their

contributions

during

circumstances at the time of divorce.

the

marriage

and

their

Neumeyer v. Neumeyer, 745

P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987).
It is patently inequitable to award the Defendant an
equity interest in property with a negative value.

In Jackson v.

Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980), the parties had a short term
marriage during which time they incurred $60,000.00 in debt, which
significantly

exceeded

all

assets.

The

parties

acquired

a

residence with a loan from the Plaintiff's father; the residence at
the time of the divorce had $6,000.00 equity. The residence, along
13

with all other assets, were awarded to the Defendant and the
Defendant was required to pay all liabilities.

The Plaintiff

appealed from the Divorce Decree requesting the Court to award her
the $6,000.00 in equity in the home, as well as other property,
free of liens and encumbrances.

Upholding the trial court, the

Court held that where the Defendant was required to pay all
indebtedness on the property, which dramatically exceeded its
value, it was fair and equitable that he should also receive the
majority of the property.

Contrary to the equitable principles

applied in the Jackson case, the trial court is awarding Mr. Torres
a lien in pre-marital property which has a negative value, where
the debt is being totally paid by Mrs. Torres. Additionally, the
trial court failed to take into account that Mr. Torres made no
direct monetary

contributions

toward the home.

Rather than

awarding Mr. Torres a $4,000.00 equitable lien, as though the
property increased in value, it would be more equitable to require
Mr. Torres to pay Mr. Torres for the decline in value which
occurred while the parties lived together. In essence, he lived in
the home for free, paying no rent or mortgage payments? and is now
being compensated for his only contribution. The net effect is the
Plaintiff pays for Defendant's housing expenses.
B.

Requiring the Plaintiff to Pay for Two Rings Which

Were Gifts to Her From Her Husband is Inequitable. The Court found
14

that the Defendant purchased two rings from Morgan Jewelers on
September 26, 1987 for a total cost of $4,327.03 (Findings of Fact,
para. 10).

The Court further found that the Defendant made

completed gifts to the Plaintiff shortly before Christmas 1987.
When the parties separated in mid-January, 1989, the Defendant was
still paying on the rings.

The Court awarded the rings to the

Plaintiff but required her to reimburse the Defendant for all
payments made on the rings since January, 1989

(Supplemental

Decree, para. 4 ) .
The general legal principals relating to gifts received
during marriage is outlined in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d
304, 308 (Utah 1988).

In making an equitable division, trial

courts should generally award property acquired by one spouse by
gift and inheritance during the marriage to that spouse, together
with any appreciating or enhancement of its values unless " 1) the
other spouse has contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or
protection

of

that

property, thereby

acquiring

an

equitable

interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its
identity

lost through commingling

of exchanges or where the

acquiring spouse had made a gift of an interest in the property to
the other spouse."
The case before the Court does not fall with any of the
exceptions outlined in Mortensen. Mr. Torres made a completed gift
15

to Mrs. Torres with the intent that she become the owner of the
rings and not that she be required to pay for the rings. Once the
gift is completed, the obligation to pay for the gifts should
remain with Mr. Torres.

By requiring Mrs. Torres to essentially

payoff the balance owing on the rings since January, 1989, the
Court is taking the gift to Mrs. Torres and requiring her to pay
for it.

This is true even though Mr. Torres took the rings at

separation, has kept them in his possession since then and has
changed the stones to prevent Mrs. Torres from receiving the full
value of the gift.
Additionally, the Court's ruling is inconsistent with the
legal principal that "the marital estate should be valued as of the
time of the Divorce Decree."
(Utah 1985).

Berqer v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697

The Court related its Order back to the date of

separation in January, 1989, rather than valuing the gift without
debt as of the date of the Divorce Decree.

This method of

retroactive valuation of liabilities and assets of the parties is
simply not warranted by the circumstances in this case.

There is

no equitable reason that the trial court should deviate from the
general rule.
The

Court

abused

its

discretion

in

requiring

the

Plaintiff to pay for the rings gifted to her by the Defendant.

16

C.

Requiring the Plaintiff to Pay One-half of the

Medical Expenses When the Defendant Terminated the Insurance Policy
on the Day of the Operation is Inequitable.

The Defendant had

maintained medical insurance for the Plaintiff during the marriage.
During the course of the litigation, there were no Orders entered
regarding

maintenance

of

insurance.

However, the

Plaintiff

testified that the Defendant mentioned that he had taken the
Plaintiff off the insurance coverage, and the Court admonished the
Defendant to reinstate the coverage (Findings of Fact, 12).

In

July, 1990, Plaintiff consulted with a physician who obtained preapproval from the Utah Public Employee's Health Program.

In

reliance of the historical fact of the Defendant maintaining the
Plaintiff on his health policy, the Plaintiff had an operation on
August 15, 1990.

On the same date, the Defendant terminated his

coverage of the Plaintiff, which was retroactive to August 1, 1990.
Rather than dealing with the inequity created by the Defendant's
actions, the Court treated the medical bills as any other marital
debt and required the Plaintiff and Defendant to each pay one-half
of the medical bills incurred for the operation.

(Supplemental

Decree, para. 6 ) .
The gross injustice created by the Court's Order is
evident. The Court through the concept of fairness and equity out

17

the window by its Order.

As stated in Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d

6 (1982):
Although this Court may weigh the evidence and
substitute its judgments for that of the trial
court in divorce actions, this Court will not do
so lightly and merely because its judgment may
differ from that of the trial judge. A trial
court's apportionment of property will not be
disturbed unless it works such a manifest
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear
abuse of discretion, id at 8.
Without notice, and with apparent malice, the Defendant's
action unquestionably were directed at financially harming the
Plaintiff.

Mrs. Torres acted innocently and in reliance upon her

husband having maintained the health insurance policy.

The Court

requiring Mrs. Torres to pay one-half of the medical bills, which
would

have

been

paid

by

insurance

but

for

Defendant's

maliciousness, is clearly unjust.
D.

The Trial Court's Failure to Award Mrs. Torres'

Attorney's Fees is Inequitable. The Court found that the Defendant
made completed gifts to the Defendant of the two rings shortly
before Christmas in 1987 (Findings of Fact, 10).

However, the

Defendant had taken the rings from the Plaintiff and would not
return them. The Court further found that the Defendant terminated
Plaintiff's coverage under his health plan on August 15, 1990, the
day of the Plaintiff's operation (Findings of Fact, 12). The Court
further found that the Defendant terminating the health and medical
18

coverage on Plaintiff ended any possibility of settlement and "each
party has paid a high price."

The Court also found that each

party, because of the disputed nature of the assets, contributed to
the inability to settle the case, and each party had approximately
the same monthly income and, therefore, did not demonstrate a need
for fees.

However, it is apparent from the actions of the

Defendant that the ruthless manner in which he has treated the
Plaintiff during this litigation has propelled the matter to trial.
Equity demands recognition of these factors which have prolonged
litigation requiring the Plaintiff to incur significantly greater
attorney's fees than otherwise would have been necessary had the
Defendant acted reasonably.
Traditionally, Utah courts have required a showing that
a

party

seeking

alimony

show

need

and

a

basis

for

the

reasonableness of the award. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85
(Utah 1980).

A factor which should be considered by the Court,

however, when dealing with the basis of awarding attorney's fees,
is that party which is responsible for prolonging the litigation.
As stated by the Plaintiff, she anticipated paying her attorney's
fees and would have settled on almost all issues until the point
when Mr. Torres took her off of his insurance and refused to pay
for the medical bills.
"C").

(Transcript pp. 91-92 attached as Exhibit

When the mean-spirited actions of one party to a litigation
19

promote continued attorney's fees, it is fair and equitable that
the parties so behaving be charged with the fees.
CONCLUSION
It is the Plaintiff's position that equity require that
the Court's Order granting the Defendant an equitable lien of
$4,000.00 in Plaintiff's home be set aside based upon the abuse of
discretion by the trial court.

The Court Order requiring the

Plaintiff to pay for the rings after separation in January, 1989,
which were given to her by the Defendant should be set aside in
that the Order fails to follow settled principals of law relating
to gifts.

The Court's Order requiring the Defendant to pay one-

half of her medical expenses is unreasonable and inequitable and
should be set aside as an abuse of discretion, requiring the
Defendant

to

deductible.

pay

all

of

the

medical

expenses,

except

the

The Court's failure to award at least one-half of

Plaintiff's attorney's fees should be set aside as an abuse of
discretion, and the Defendant should be required to pay one-half
thereof.
DATED this 't>/ day of August, 1992.
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON

CRAIG #T. PETERSON
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellant
20

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing, APPELLANT'S BRIEF, this
7 £?

;/

day of August, 1992, to:
David R. Hartwig, Esq.
263 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Attorney for Respondent

—v

Torres.AB/P8
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EXHIBIT "A"
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J /

C r a i g M. P e t e r s o n (2579)
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
LITTLZJIZLD i PETERSON
426 South 500 East
S a l t Lake C i t v f Utah 84102
T e l e p h o n e : (8011 521-0435
III THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

::: AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATZ OF UTAE

LYNNETTE MANSKZ TORRES,

SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,

JOHN MARTIN TORRES,
Defendant.

Case No. 894902184
Jucce
—ooOoo————

The above matter came before the Court for trial on July
31, 1991 and concluded on August 6f 1991.

The Plaintiff was

present in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson.
The Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel,
David R. Zartvig. The Court having heretofore entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf does now enter its Supplemental
Decree of Divorce as follows:

1

SUPPLEME!7TAL DECRES OF DIVORCE
1.

The Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this

matter en February 4, 1991 f is supplemented for the division of
property by this Order.
2.

The

Defendant

shall

be

awarded

an

equity

lien

against the Plaintiff's residence in the amount of $4, COO.
2.

The Plaintiff shall be awarded ail right, title and

interest in ate to the proceeds from the sale of the 1S73 Reineil
boat, and eacn cf the parties shall be denied any additional claims
they have mace for recovery en losses and repairs made to said
boat.
4•

The Plaintiff shall be awarded both rings purchased

by the Defendant from Morgan Jewelers on or about September 26,
1987.

However, Plaintiff is ordered to reimburse the Defendant for

any payments he has made to Morgan Jewelers for the rings since the
parties' separation in mid-January, 1989. The Defendant shall hold
a possessory lien on the rings until the payments provided herein
are fully satisfied.

The Defendant shall restore the original

stones to the rings and obtain certification from Morgan Jewelers
that the rings are the same as they were when they were originally
delivered to him in September, 1987.

2

5.
portion

The Defendant shall be ordered to pay the uncovered

cf treatment for the Plaintiff's jaw in the amount of

$65.75.
6.

Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the total

medical bills incurred for surgery and treatment to the Plaintiff
on or about August 15 f 1990 for a deviated septum and a ventral
hernia.

Further, each cf the parties snail be ordered to pay one-

half of any fees cr costs taxed against the parties through any
collection or legal actions, and the Defendant shall be ordered to
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
7.

Each of the parties shall be ordered to pay their

own attorney's fees and costs which they have incurred in these
proceedings.
DATED this Z l ^ d a v cf January, 1992.
BY TEE' COURT:

D i s t r i c t Court JXicge"
Approved as t o form:

DAVID R. EARTWIG, Esq.
A t t o r n e y f o r defendant
TarxM.SDC/ru

3

EXHIBIT "B"
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CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579
Attorney for Plaintiff
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
LYNNETTE MANSKE TORRES,
Plaintiff,

: FINDINGS OF FACT AND
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

:

JOHN MARTIN TORRES,

:

Defendant.

: Case No. 894902184 DA
: Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
ooOoo

The above matter came before the Court on Wednesday, the
16th day of January, 1991, at the hour of 8:30 a.m., the Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding for hearing.

The Plaintiff was

present in person and represented by Counsel, Craig M. Peterson.
The Defendant was present in person and represented by Counsel,
David R. Hartwig.

The Defendant having agreed, by and through

Counsel, that the Plaintiff may receive a Decree of Divorce through
bifurcation of these proceedings reserving all remaining issues for
trial before the Court, the Court having concluded that the matter
should be bifurcated, and the default of the Defendant entered as

1

to the issue of the granting of the divorce, the Court having
entered the default of the Defendant for that purpose, having
received the testimony of the Plaintiff and having reviewed the
pleadings on file herein, does now enter its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties herein were bona fide residents of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three months immediately
proceeding the filing of this action.
2.

The parties are husband and wife, having been

married in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on July 19, 1986.
During the term of the marriage the parties commenced to argue
continuously, the Defendant committed assault and battery upon the
person of the Plaintiff causing her physical injury, the parties
have lived separate and apart for in excess of two years, the
Plaintiff is no longer in love with the Defendant and cannot
continue to remain married to him.
3.
such

The Plaintiff is in need of health insurance and

insurance

legislation.

should

be

available

to

her

through

Cobra

Each of the parties should be required to undertake

the completion of any documents necessary to provide such health
insurance for the benefit of the Plaintiff.
4.

All remaining

issues should be reserved
2

to be

determined at the time of trial in this matter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court
does enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as follows:
1.

This Court does have jurisdiction to enter a Decree

of Divorce in this matter.
2.
against

the

The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce
Defendant

upon

the

grounds

of

irreconcilable

differences.
3.

Each of the parties should be ordered to undertake

whatever actions are necessary for the Plaintiff to obtain health
and accident insurance through the Defendant's employer pursuant to
the requirements of Cobra.
4.

All remaining issues should be reserved for final

determination at trial in this matter.
5.

This matter is set to be tried to the Court on those

issues on May 17, 1991, at the hour of 8:30 a.m.
DATED this

day of

, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

Kenneth Rigtrup
District Court Judge

3

Torres v. Torres
Re: Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law

Approval as to form:

David R. Harrwig
11004.pld/capl

EXHIBIT "C"
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canceled?

3|
4

A.

Yes,

Q»

In addition, the primary i3sue has been

tne house and his interest in the house?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q»

Is the -- are you willing* again* to

7

give hia that house?

8

A.

Definitely.

9

CU

Has the i3sue oeen any interest that he

10

raignt have in having paid for that boat?

11

A.

Pardon ae?

12

Q.

Has an issue also been any interest that

13
14

he aignt have had in paying for that boat?
A.

15
16

Yes.
THE COURT:

understand

I'm not sure that I

that.

17

MR. PETERSON:

18

very good question, anyway.

19

That's okay.

It's not a

As a result of tnose positions on the

20

part of Mr. Torres* is it your position that you f re in

21

court unnecessarily

22

A.

today?

Yes.

23

MR. PETERSON:

**

THE COURT:

Thank you.

You may cross.

25
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1
2

0#

Are you now, nowever, asking the Court

to award you attorney fees in this matter?

3

A.

Yes, I am*

4

Q«

Do you have a specific amount in mind

5
61
7
81

that you are asking the Court to award?
A*

I would like hiia to pay half of tnen, at

least; or more than that*
Q.

Half of the total foes that have been

9

incurred?

10

A.

?es.

11

0.

And it is your expectation that the fee3

12

will generally exceed 55,500, in total, is that

13

correct?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Is it your desire that the Court order

16

Mr. Torres to pay not less than $2,500, and

17

preferably, $3,000 toward your fees?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Qt

Why is it that you ask the Court for

20
21

that award in fees?
A.

Because I didn't ask to be here over

22

this surgery.

23

thing had we just settled out of court.

24
25

Q#

I mean, it could have been a simple

And, in fact, were you at a stage that

was verging on settlement until the insurance was
91
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